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Abstract
We study a two-sided network investment game consisting of two
sets of players, called providers and users. The game is set in two
stages. In the first stage, providers aim to maximize their profit by
investing in bandwidth of cloud computing services. The investments
of the providers yield a set of usable services for the users. In the second
stage, each user wants to process a task and therefore selects a bundle
of services so as to minimize the total processing time. We assume
the total processing time to be separable over the chosen services and
the processing time of each service to depend on the utilization of
the service and the installed bandwidth. We provide insights on how
competition between providers affects the total costs of the users and
show that every game on a series-parallel graph can be reduced to an
equivalent single edge game when analyzing the set of subgame perfect
Nash equilibria.
1 Introduction
With the increasing availability of a fast and reliable internet connection, the
demand for and the importance of cloud-computing services is heavily grow-
ing. That is why large IT-companies such as Amazon, Google or Microsoft
have been investing massively in the improvement of their cloud services
in recent years. New high-speed cables are being placed, high performance
hardware has been installed, new software has been developed, and machine
numbers have been scaled up [21]. Interestingly, prices for these services are
typically charged per usage time (see for example, Amazon Web Services [3],
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Microsoft Azure [26] and Google Cloud [17]). This might a-priory lead to
a situation, where a non-optimal infrastructure takes longer to process the
users’ tasks, and thus even leads to a higher income for the corresponding
provider. This paper addresses this issue by means of a theoretical model
and provides some results on how competition between providers helps to
prevent this behavior of providers.
We study the problem by means of a two-stage game, which we call a
network investment game. In the first stage, a set of providers invests in
bandwidths of services that are used by users in the second stage to process
their task. These services could be different types of on-demand cloud com-
puting, storage, data-base, security or media services. We assume that these
services are either complements or substitutes to each other. This implies
that the set of feasible bundles of services for the users can be represented
by means of source-sink paths in a series-parallel network. Two services that
are complementary can be modeled as two edges that are connected in series,
whereas two services that are substitutes to each other can be modeled by
means of two parallel edges. A similar idea has been used by Correa et al. in
[14]. We call this underlying graph the technology graph. However, before a
user can use a particular service, there must be a provider that has invested
in bandwidth for that particular service. In other words, the investments of
the providers induce a subgraph, the set of usable services, of the original
technology graph that can be used by the users to process their task. Each
user selects a bundle of services that is needed to perform the user’s task
at minimum total processing time. The total processing time of a service
depends on the quantity of users that chooses the particular service and the
installed bandwidth of the providers. We assume that each user has a given
willingness to pay for taking part in the game and is only present if the to-
tal costs do not exceed this value. Given that users impose externalities on
each other, we assume that users in the second stage choose their bundle of
services according to a Wardrop equilibrium [32] in the corresponding graph
of usable services.
Given that prices for services are typically charged per usage time, we
use the users’ costs as a proxy for the total revenue of the providers invest-
ing in a service. This total revenue is shared proportionally among those
providers investing in the service. Proportional sharing is used in many dif-
ferent settings, e.g., in cooperative game theory [28] and in the context of
congestion games [27]. We assume that the providers’ aim is to maximize
profit, which depends on the amount of users using their services and the
total amount invested. Intuitively, little investment in a service implies a
high processing time and thus a high price paid by users, but only a small
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fraction of users will choose the service. Too much investment might lead
to a large fraction of users, but only for a low price.
1.1 Contribution
We are interested in how competition between selfish providers affects the
choices made by the users in the network investment game. More formally,
we study the existence and uniqueness of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in
which in the first stage, providers maximize profit and in the second stage,
users choose a Wardrop equilibrium given the strategies of the providers in
the first stage. We then consider the performance of equilibria in terms of
the price of anarchy [23]. The price of anarchy measures the difference in
performance between the worst subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and the
social optimum. In fact, for all instances we consider, the performance of
all subgame perfect Nash equilibria is the same and we are able to provide
an exact characterization of this performance.
Our main result, Theorem 6, provides a simplification of the structure
of equilibrium investments for series-parallel networks. We focus on series-
parallel networks as this represents bundles of services consisting of comple-
ments and substitutes. We show that we can restrict attention to invest-
ments in which each provider invests in shortest paths (with respect to the
number of services). This means that providers have no incentive to diver-
sify their portfolio and invest in complements, nor to invest in services that
can be replaced by less services. The result has some interesting implica-
tions. When being interested in either a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
the social optimum, or combining both in the price of anarchy, it is without
loss of generality to assume that the network consists of a single edge. This
greatly simplifies the remaining analysis.
We then study the quality of subgame perfect Nash equilibria for dif-
ferent classes of users. In Section 4, we assume that all users have a fixed
common willingness to pay. We precisely characterize the society’s surplus
and the providers’ profits both in a corresponding optimal solution and in
every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. It turns out that the price of anar-
chy with respect to society’s surplus can be bounded by a constant, whereas
the ratio with respect to providers’ profits can grow linearly with the num-
ber of providers. In Section 5, we redo the same analysis for users that
have different willingnesses to pay and obtain similar results as for the fixed
reservation value case.
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1.2 Related work
Our model is closely related to several different classes of recently studied
models. There is a close connection with network design games, as intro-
duced by Anshelevich et al. [5] and extended by Anshelevich et al. [4]. In
these games, selfish agents want to connect a personal source to sink by
means of a path, and they share the costs of an edge in case multiple agents
use that edge in their path. In network investment games, providers do
not share the cost of an edge, but rather the revenue from the users using
that edge. As a result, we obtain that providers want to invest in paths in
equilibrium, an assumption that is not made a-priori.
In network investment games, we assume that users in the second stage
behave as in a non-atomic network congestion game. The idea behind con-
gestion games is that selfish users try to minimize their cost in an already
existing network. The best-known solution concept for these games is the
Wardrop equilibrium [32]. Beckmann et al. [7] and Dafermos and Spar-
row [16] proved some structural results of this equilibrium concept. Rough-
garden and Tardos [30] were the first to obtain a bound on the price of
anarchy for non-atomic routing games.
Recently, starting with Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [1], several authors con-
sidered a two-stage game in which edge owners compete for users by means
of tolling. In those games, the users in the second stage also choose a
Wardrop equilibrium. Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [1] only considered parallel
networks, which was then generalized to parallel-serial networks by Ace-
moglu and Ozdaglar [2]. Ozdaglar [29] and Hayrapetyan et al. [20] allowed
for elastic users. Johari et al. [22] studied an extension that includes entry
and investments decisions. Recently, Correa et al. [13] and Harks et al. [18]
considered the game in which a central authority is allowed to impose price
caps. In the former paper, caps are allowed to be different on different edges,
in the latter the cap is uniform. Almost all of the above models, with the
exception of Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [2], impose the simplifying assumption
that the topology of the network is restricted to be parallel. We allow for
arbitrary series-parallel graphs and do not impose any restriction on the
strategy space of the providers, that is, every provider is allowed to invest
in every edge of the network.
A slightly different, but closely related model is the game analyzed by
Correa et al. [14]. Here each edge in a series-parallel network represents a
producer that competes by selecting a markup that then determines a price
function. The main difference to our work is that producers are identified
by an edge and thus do not have the possibility to compete on other edges.
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Leader-follower models as the previous ones are also known as Stackel-
berg games [31]. Recently, lots of attention has been placed on Stackelberg
pricing games. Starting with Labbe´ et al. [24], who considered the prob-
lem in which a leader sets prices on a subset of edges and the follower
chooses a shortest path, several authors generalized to different combinato-
rial problems for the follower. For example, Cardinal et al. [12] studied the
Stackelberg minimum spanning tree problem, and Bilo` el al. [8] and later
Cabello [11] investigated the Stackelberg shortest path tree problem. Balcan
et al. [6] and Briest et al. [10] considered the power of single-price strategies.
Bo¨hnlein et al. [9] extended the analysis of this simple algorithm beyond the
combinatorial setting.
Lastly, there is a close connection to some of the traditional models
of competition in economics, like Cournot competition [15]. We refer to
Harks and Timmermans [19] for some other recent work connecting atomic
splittable congestion games to multimarket Cournot oligopolies.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a two-sided market in which users purchase bundles of services.
The set of feasible bundles is specified by a technology graph Gst = (V,E),
which is a directed series-parallel network with source s ∈ V and sink t ∈ V .
Each edge corresponds to a service. Every s-t path in Gst describes a feasible
bundle of services. Note that serial edges in Gst correspond to complements,
whereas parallel edges correspond to substitutes.
We model such a market as a two-stage game. In the first stage, a set
of providers chooses to invest into services represented by edges. In the
second stage, the users select bundles of services or paths in Gst given the
investments of the providers in the first stage.
The amount of investment affects the speed of the services. We assume
for simplicity that prices for each service are charged automatically on a per-
time basis. That is, the price function of an edge directly depends on the
chosen investments into the corresponding service in the first stage and the
current load induced by the users in the second stage. These two quantities
highly influence the time that is needed to finish a job on a cloud computing
device. Our choice of the price functions and the model of network invest-
ment games are motivated by time-dependent prices that are implemented
in Amazon Web Services [3], Microsoft Azure [26] and Google Cloud [17] for
using on-demand virtual machines.
We assume for simplicity that each user is of infinitesimal size which
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allows us to model the second stage as a non-atomic routing game. However
it is important to note that the overall demand is not fixed, but depends
on the total price the users have to pay for the services. The demand thus
depends on the investment of the providers.
More formally, a network investment game is given by a tuple G =
(Gst, N, u), where Gst = (V,E) is a directed series-parallel network with
source s ∈ V and sink t ∈ V , N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of providers, and
u : R+ → R+ is the reservation function. Reservation functions model
the users’ willingness to pay and impose elastic demand. This concept has
already been used in the work of Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten [7].
Intuitively, there is a total demand of x in the game if the total price for
bundles of services under demand x is not larger than u(x). We assume that
u is non-increasing.
The Provider’s Strategies. Each provider i ∈ N chooses an invest-
ment bi,e ≥ 0 for every edge e ∈ E. Let bi = (bi,e)e∈E be the investments
of provider i. Given an investment matrix b = (bi)i∈N , the total investment
on edge e is be =
∑
i∈N bi,e. Given b ∈ RN×E+ , we define the set of relevant
edges by E+(Gst) = {e ∈ E(Gst) | be > 0}. The price ce for a user using
an edge e, i.e., a service, is an increasing function of the amount of users fe
using edge e and defined by
ce(fe, be) =
{
fe
be
e ∈ E+(Gst),
∞ otherwise.
Note that this cost function is a very simple model for prices that depend
on the total load of a service and the total investment. Here, we use the
simplifying assumption that the time that is needed to complete a service
request scales linearly with the load on the machines and inverse linearly
with the investment.
The User’s Actions. Let P(Gst) denote the set of s-t paths, and let
P∗(Gst) denote the set of s-t paths with minimum number of edges in Gst.
We model the behavior of the users by a flow in Gst. The flow is defined to
be a non-negative vector f(Gst) = (fP )P∈P(Gst). Note that we stick to the
path-definition of flows, because we assume strong flow conservation. For a
flow f(Gst) and an edge e ∈ E(Gst), let fe =
∑
P∋e fP denote the amount
of flow on edge e. Let |f(Gst)| =
∑
P∈P(Gst)
fP be the total amount of users
that are routed through the network under f(Gst).
For a given investment matrix b, we call some flow f(Gst) a Wardrop
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equilibrium if for all P,P ′ ∈ P(Gst) with fP > 0, we have∑
e∈P
ce(fe, be) ≤
∑
e∈P ′
ce(fe, be) and
∑
e∈P
ce(fe, be) <∞.
In a network investment game, we assume that both the providers and
the users act selfishly. For simplicity, we assume that users are infinitesimal
small and thus, a Wardop flow arises in the second stage. We will remark
below that, for a given investment matrix and a given non-increasing reser-
vation function, the arising Wardrop flow is uniquely defined, which is nec-
essary for our model to be well-defined. Given the investment matrix b, we
denote the corresponding Wardrop flow by f(Gst, b). If Gst and/or b is clear
from the context, we often omit the dependency on Gst and/or b in order
to improve readability. If s and t are clear from the context, we sometimes
write G instead of Gst.
The Provider’s Profits. The profit of provider i ∈ N depends on the
associated Wardrop flow f , the investment matrix b and the actual cost for
the users ce(fe, be). We define it by
πi(b) =
∑
e∈E+
bi,e
be
· fe · ce(fe, be)−
∑
e∈E+
bi,e =
∑
e∈E+
bi,e · f
2
e
b2e
−
∑
e∈E+
bi,e.
where
bi,e
be
is the proportional share of provider i ∈ N and ∑e∈E+ bi,e her
investment costs. This profit function is motivated by that fact that each
user pays a load-dependent price for using a service of the provider, which is
proportionally divided among those providers investing in the service, and
the provider has some cost for installing bandwidth for the services. We
consider the very simple model that investment costs are linear and the
profit is given by the payment of the users minus the investment costs.
We call an investment matrix b ∈ RN×E+ a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium if for all i ∈ N and all b′i ∈ RE+,
πi(b) ≥ πi(b′i, b−i).
Given b ∈ RN×E+ , we call b′i a better response for provider i ∈ N if πi(b′i, b−i) >
πi(b). In a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, no provider has a better re-
sponse. We call a better response b′i demand preserving if |f(b′i, b−i)| =
|f(b)|.
The Social Welfare, or social surplus, is traditionally defined as the
sum of the providers’ surplus and the user’s surplus. In our model, similarly
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as in Hayrapetyan et al. [20], this boils down to,
SW (b) =
∑
i∈N
πi(b)+
∫ |f |
0
u(x) dx−
∑
e∈E+
fece(fe, be) =
∫ |f |
0
u(x) dx−
∑
e∈E
be.
Note that payments do not appear in the social welfare, as they are transfers
from users to providers. An investment matrix b∗ is called a social optimum
if b∗ maximizes the social welfare.
For a given instance G, let E(G) denote the set of subgame perfect Nash
equilibria. Notice that E(G) might be empty. A natural question is to
quantify the loss in social welfare due to competition. Typically, researchers
provide upper bounds for the loss in efficiency. We are able to precisely
bound this inefficiency for any given instance. To this end, we define the
price of anarchy and price of stability for a given instance as
PoA(G) =
sup
b∗∈RN+
SW (b∗)
inf
b∈E(G)
SW (b)
, and PoS(G) =
sup
b∗∈RN+
SW (b∗)
sup
b∈E(G)
SW (b)
.
We assume that 0/0 = 1 and PoA(G) = PoS(G) =∞ if E(G) is empty.
A second natural question is to quantify the loss in total profit due to
competition. We call this the providers’ price of anarchy and providers’
price of stability, and define it by
PPoA(G) =
sup
b∗∈RN+
∑
i∈N πi(b
∗)
inf
b∈E(G)
∑
i∈N πi(b)
, and PPoS(G) =
sup
b∗∈RN+
∑
i∈N πi(b
∗)
sup
b∈E(G)
∑
i∈N πi(b)
.
As before, we assume that 0/0 = 1 and PPoA(G) = PPoS(G) =∞ if E(G)
is empty.
We start with some simple observations on Wardrop equilibria for this
model. To calculate the flow that models the users, we distinguish between
two cases. Either there exists a s-t path P ∈ P such that be > 0 for all
e ∈ P , or not. Put differently, either there is a path P such that for all
e ∈ P we have e ∈ E+(Gst), or all paths have investment 0 for at least one
edge. If there is no s-t path with strictly positive investment on every edge,
the Wardrop equilibrium is the empty flow with |f | = 0. If there is some
P ∈ P with be > 0 on all edges e ∈ P , we obtain the following results.
Remark 1 ([7, 16]). If f is a Wardrop equilibrium, then there is a constant
cb ≥ 0 such that
∑
e∈P ce(fe, be) = cb whenever P ∈ P with fe > 0 for all
e ∈ P , and ∑e∈P ce(fe, be) ≥ cb otherwise.
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Remark 2 ([7, 16]). For two Wardrop flows f, f ′ with |f | = |f ′| in a network
with strictly increasing cost functions on every edge, we have that fe = f
′
e
for all e ∈ E.
Note that, by Remarks 1 and 2, we have that the cost per user in the
network investment game cb, as defined in Remark 1, only depends on the
total demand |f | for all Wardrop flows f and a fixed b. Let us focus on
this dependence and write cb(|f |) instead of cb. It turns out that cb(|f |) is
in fact strictly increasing in |f |. The following proposition is due to Lin,
Roughgarden, and Tardos [25]. However, in their variant of the proposition
they only assume non-decreasing cost functions and show that cb(|f |) is non-
decreasing in |f |. Since we have strictly increasing cost functions, we modify
their proof in the appendix such that we get a slightly stronger statement.
Proposition 3 ([25]). cb(|f |) is strictly increasing in |f |.
We note that we can extend Proposition 3 and show that for network
investment games, cb(|f |) is even linear in |f |. The proof uses the series-
parallel structure of the graph and can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 4. Given a vector of investment levels b, cb(|f |) is a linear
function of |f |.
The above two propositions are very important for the setup of network
investment games. We assume that demand directly depends on the actual
cost for the users, and thus indirectly on b. In order to do so, we use that
the costs for each user are given by a linear function cb(|f |). Combining
this with the reservation function u stating that an amount of u(x) has a
willingness to pay at least x, we define
|f | = inf{x ∈ R+ | u(x) ≤ cb(x)}.
Note that this infimum is well defined, since u is non-increasing and cb(·) is
strictly increasing due to Proposition 3. Furthermore, let us illustrate the
dependence of |f | on b by the following observation. An increase of some
be for fixed f induces a change in the corresponding edge cost ce(fe, be) and
weakly decreases the cost of the flow f . Since Wardrop flows are optimal
flows for linear cost functions, this weakly decreases the value of cb(x) for
any fixed x. Overall, one can show that a change of b changes the slope of
cb(x) in the definition above, which then might result in a different demand.
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3 Characterization of Equilibria
In this section, we derive some important properties of subgame perfect
Nash equilibria. First, we prove our main result that in every subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium, every provider only invests in shortest (with respect
to the number of edges) paths. The implications of this result are quite
significant and twofold. First, it implies a nice characterization of markets
that can be modeled by means of a network investment game. Second, the
result simplifies the further analysis of the game significantly. As long as we
are interested in equilibrium investments, the analysis gets notably easier.
Instead of considering a strategy space in which every provider is allowed
to invest in every edge separately, we can restrict attention to strategies in
which providers invest in shortest paths. We will heavily use this character-
ization in the later sections.
Definition 5. We call a strategy bi a path strategy of provider i if there
exist values (bi,P )P∈P with bi,P ≥ 0 such that bi,e =
∑
P :e∈P bi,P for all
e ∈ E.
Note that the definition ensures that we can always decompose a path
strategy (bi,e)e∈E of a provider i ∈ N defined on edges into a path decompo-
sition. Thus, when considering path strategies, we can work with the path
decomposition of investments, instead of the investments defined on edges.
If all providers’ investments are path strategies, it is immediately clear that
we can also define bP =
∑
i∈N bi,P for all P ∈ P and |b| =
∑
P∈P bP .
Note that, when using the term shortest paths, we always refer to shortest
paths with respect to the number of edges in the path. Now, we are able to
state and prove our main theorem of this section.
Theorem 6.
(i) In every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, every provider i ∈ N
chooses a path strategy on shortest paths.
(ii) Let i ∈ N . If every provider j ∈ N \ {i} chooses a path strategy
on shortest paths then the following holds: For every strategy bi of
provider i, there is a path strategy on shortest paths b′i inducing the
same amount of flow and at least the same profit for provider i.
For the proof of Theorem 6, we need the following two lemmas. In the
first lemma we observe that in equilibrium a provider cannot choose positive
investments on two paths of different length. If so, there is always a better
response that only invests in the shorter of the two paths.
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Lemma 7. Let (G, s, t) be a series-parallel graph that is a parallel compo-
sition of series-parallel graphs (G1, s, t) and (G2, s, t). Let b be a vector of
path strategies of paths that all are either shortest s-t paths in G1 with length
k or shortest s-t paths in G2 with length ℓ. If k < ℓ, and bi,P2 > 0 for some
provider i ∈ N and P2 ∈ P∗(G2), then there is a demand preserving better
response for i with bi,P2 = 0.
Next we turn to graphs that are a series composition of two subgraphs.
Assuming that every provider’s strategy can be decomposed into two path
strategies for the two subgraphs, we show that in equilibrium they must
invest the same value in both subgraphs. Furthermore, if all other providers
play shortest path strategies, for all strategies of a provider, the provider
always has an at least as good strategy in shortest paths.
Lemma 8. Let (G, s, t) be a series-parallel graph that is a series composi-
tion of series-parallel graphs (G1, s, v) and (G2, v, t). Let b be a vector of
investments (bi,e)i∈N,e∈E that can be partitioned into (b
1
i,e)i∈N,e∈E(G1) and
(b2i,e)i∈N,e∈E(G2) such that b
1 and b2 are shortest path strategies in their cor-
responding graphs G1 and G2, respectively.
(i) If
∑
P∈P∗(G1)
b1i,P 6=
∑
P∈P∗(G2)
b2i,P for some provider i ∈ N , then
there is a demand preserving better response for some j ∈ N .
(ii) If, additionally,
∑
P∈P∗(G1)
b1m,P =
∑
P∈P∗(G2)
b2m,P for all providers
m 6= i, then the following holds. For every strategy bi there is a shortest
path strategy b′i with |f(b−i, bi)| = |f(b−i, b′i)| and at least the same
profit for provider i, i.e., πi(b−i, bi) ≤ πi(b−i, b′i).
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6. The main difficulty in proving statements on strategy
changes of providers lies in the fact that the users’ costs and, hence, demand
and flow might change. However, we are able to circumvent the dependency
on the reservation function by only considering demand preserving better
responses. In fact, we prove the first statement of the theorem by showing
the following stronger statement. (i’) If there is a provider i ∈ N such
that bi is not a path strategy on shortest paths, then there is a provider
j ∈ N with a demand preserving better response. Note that statement (i’)
implies part (i) of the theorem. We show statement (i’) and part (ii) of the
theorem by induction on the structure of the series-parallel graph G. For the
base case, a graph with a single edge, both statements are trivially fulfilled.
For the induction step, assume the statements are true for series-parallel
11
graphs G1 and G2, and we will argue that the statements are true for a new
series-parallel graph that either arises from a parallel composition or a series
composition of G1 and G2.
For (i’), observe the following: If there is a provider i such that bi is not a
path strategy in one of the two subgraphs G1 or G2, we can assume w.l.o.g.
that it is not a path strategy in G1. Then there is a demand preserving
better response in G1 for some provider j. This is also a demand preserving
better response for j in G, since it is demand preserving in G1, and thus
does not change any flow in G2, and thus any profit in G2. So we can assume
that the investments bi are shortest paths within G1 and within G2 for all
i ∈ N .
Case 1: Parallel Composition. Assume G is the result of a parallel
composition of series-parallel networks G1 and G2. For proving (i’), denote
the length of the shortest paths in G1 by k and the length of the shortest
paths in G2 by ℓ. If k 6= ℓ and there is a provider i that invests in the longer
path, we can apply Lemma 7 to show that there is a demand preserving
better response for provider i. For (ii), observe that if bj is a path strategy
on shortest paths for every provider j ∈ N \ {i}, it is also a path strategy
on shortest paths in both subgraphs. Thus, by induction, provider i has a
shortest path strategy b′i that is demand preserving w.r.t. bi within G1 and
G2. Note that this is already a strategy on paths that does not change the
overall demand and yields at least as much profit as bi. Note that this is
not a shortest path strategy in G only if k 6= ℓ, say w.l.o.g. k < ℓ and i
invests in G2. In this case, we apply Lemma 7 and conclude that i has a
demand preserving better response and, thus in fact has the desired strategy
on shortest paths in G.
Case 2: Series Composition. Assume G is the result of a series
composition of series-parallel networks G1 and G2. For (i’), note that have
already argued that b is a shortest path strategy within G1 and within G2
for every provider. However, if bi it is not a shortest path strategy in G for
some i ∈ N , we fulfill the conditions of Lemma 8 (i).
For (ii), note that we also fulfill the additional condition of Lemma 8 (ii).
By using the lemma, we can conclude that for every strategy bi, provider i
has a strategy b′i on shortest paths inducing the same demand and at least
the same profit.
Note that we have proven that in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
all providers invest in shortest path strategies. Additionally, for proving
that some investment matrix is an equilibrium, we can restrict the strategy
set to shortest path strategies.
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We proceed with a proposition that significantly reduces the set of short-
est path strategies. We show that if each provider chooses an investment on
shortest paths, it is irrelevant how this investment is distributed over the
shortest paths. The proof of the proposition is moved to the appendix.
Proposition 9. Let b and b′ be investment matrices such that for all i ∈ N ,
bi and b
′
i are path strategies, and bi and b
′
i can be decomposed into path
decompositions (bi,P )P∈P∗ and (b
′
i,P )P∈P∗ only using shortest paths, respec-
tively. Additionally, let
∑
P∈P∗ bi,P =
∑
P∈P∗ b
′
i,P for all i ∈ N . Then,
πi(b
′) = πi(b) for all i ∈ N and |f(b)| = |f(b′)|.
By using Proposition 9, we can classify shortest path strategies into
equivalence classes, represented by a single number.
Observation 10. In order to analyze subgame perfect Nash equilibria and
check their existence, it is sufficient to check investments on shortest paths.
By Proposition 9, we know that it is irrelevant on which shortest path a
provider invests. Thus, we can assume that each strategy of a provider is
not a vector of investments (bi,e)e∈E, but a single number
∑
P∈P∗ bi,P rep-
resenting the total investment in shortest paths.
4 Homogeneous Users
In this section, we assume that all users are homogeneous and have the
same fixed reservation value R ∈ R+ for processing a task, and decide not
to process their task if the price is above R. More formally, we assume that
u(x) = R for all x ∈ [0, d], and u(x) = 0 for all x > d, where d ∈ R+
represents the size of the population of users. We show that there always
exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and analyze the inefficiency of
equilibria in terms of the PoA and PPoA.
Recall that, by Observation 10, we can restrict the strategy spaces of
the providers to path strategies on shortest paths and denote them by a
single number. We slightly abuse notation and denote the strategy chosen
by provider i by bi ∈ R+.
We first compute the demand and profits of providers in a network in-
vestment game with a fixed reservation value.
Lemma 11. For u(x) = R for all x ∈ [0, d], and u(x) = 0 for all x > d,
where d ∈ R+,
(i) the demand |f(b)| is given by the function |f(b)| = min
{
R·|b|
k
, d
}
and
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(ii) the profit πi is given by πi(bi, b−i) = min
{
k ·
(
R2
k2
− 1
)
· bi, k ·
(
d2
|b|2
− 1
)
· bi
}
,
where k denotes the length of a shortest s-t path.
Using the closed form for the demand and the profit, we show by a case
distinction of R < k, R = k and R > k in the appendix that a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium always exists and has the same total investment.
Theorem 12. There always exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
The following example illustrates that a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium need not be unique.
Example 13. Let G consist of a single edge connecting s to t, n = 2, and
u(x) = 2 for all x ∈ [0, 1], and u(x) = 0 for all x > 1. Then for i = 1, 2,
πi(b) = min
{
3bi,
(
1
|b|2
− 1
)
· bi
}
. From the first order conditions of provider
i = 1, 2, we get that all b ∈ R2+ with 316 ≤ b1 ≤ 516 and b1+b2 = 12 are subgame
perfect Nash equilibria. Notice that the total investment is the same in all
subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Given that a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, we might won-
der about the induced performance of an equilibrium. In order to answer
this question, we consider two different measures of performance: the social
welfare and the total providers’ profits.
The main result of this section gives a tight characterization on the price
of anarchy for fixed reservation value users.
Theorem 14. For an instance G with u(x) = R for all x ∈ [0, d], and
u(x) = 0 for all x > d, where d ∈ R+,
PoA(G) = PoS(G) =


(R+k)·(R−k)
R·(R−k
√
n−2
n
)
if R > k and
√
n−2
n
≥ k
R
,
1 otherwise.
Proof. First, observe from the definition of the social welfare that SW (b) =
b ·
(
R2
k
− k
)
for all b ∈ RN+ with |b| ≤ d·kR . Moreover, SW (b) is decreasing
in |b| for |b| > d·k
R
. This implies that sup
b∈RN×E+
SW (b) is attained at some
b∗ ∈ RN+ with |b|∗ ≤ d·kR . In particular, if R ≤ k, all subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium maximize the social welfare.
So assume that R > k. Then, |b|∗ = d·k
R
. From the proof of Theorem 12,
it follows that either |b| = d·k
R
or |b| = d ·
√
n−2
n
. In the former case, we have
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that all subgame perfect Nash equilibrium maximize the social welfare. In
the latter case, we have
d·R−k· d·k
R
d·R−k·d·
√
n−2
2
= (R+k)·(R−k)
R·(R−k
√
n−2
n
)
≤ 1 + k
R
< 2, where
the last inequality follows since R > k.
Corollary 15. For all G with u(x) = R for all x ∈ [0, d], and u(x) = 0 for
all x > d, where d ∈ R+, PoA(G) < 2.
Note that the above result is quite robust, and states that, independent
of R, the social welfare under competition is at least 1/2 the optimal social
welfare.
However, the following result shows that the providers’ price of anarchy
is not bounded by a constant, but could grow linearly with the number of
providers (by at most n/2), even for fixed reservation value users.
Theorem 16. For an instance G with u(x) = R for all x ∈ [0, d], and
u(x) = 0 for all x > d, where d ∈ R+,
PPoA(G) = PPoS(G) =


n·
√
n−2
n
·(R2−k2)
2·R·k if R > k and
√
n−2
n
≥ k
R
,
1 otherwise.
Proof. First, observe that if R ≤ k, then ∑i∈N πi(b) ≤ 0 for all b ∈ RN+
and thus all subgame perfect Nash equilbria maximize the sum of providers’
profits.
Second, if R > k, then by Lemma 11, b∗ = argmax
b∈RN+
∑
i∈N πi(b) has
|b∗| = d·k
R
. In particular, if
√
n−2
n
< k
R
, all subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
maximize the sum of the providers’ profits.
Third, if R > k and
√
n−2
n
≥ k
R
, then from the proof of Theorem 12, it
follows that in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, |b| = d ·
√
n−2
n
. Hence,
we get
k·
(
d2
( d·kR )
2−1
)
· d·k
R
k·

 d2(
d·
√
n−2
n
)2−1

·d·√n−2n
=
n·
√
n−2
n
·(R2−k2)
2·R·k .
5 Heterogeneous Users
We now turn to reservation functions that correspond to heterogeneous users
with differing reservation values. As an example we choose one of the ar-
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guably simplest class of functions. We note that the study of different and
application specific functions is an interesting open question. Here, we con-
sider the reservation functions u(x) = 1
x1/α
, where α > 0, for all x ∈ R+.
We distinguish between one and multiple provider games as for one provider
games a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium might not exist. We study equi-
librium existence, equilibrium uniqueness and the inefficiency in terms of
the PoA and PPoA. Note that we again restrict the strategy spaces of the
providers to path strategies on shortest paths and denote them by a single
number bi ∈ R+ due to Observation 10.
We show that for network investment games with a single provider a
monopoly equilibrium exists if and only if α > 1. If α ≤ 1, it is always ben-
eficial for the provider to decrease investment to a smaller, strictly positive
amount. For the case of n ≥ 2 there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 17. Let k denote the length of a shortest s-t path in G. For
n = 1, there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if α > 1.
If α > 1, the equilibrium is unique and given by b1 =
(
1− 2
(α+1)
)α+1
2
kα
.
For n ≥ 2, there is a unique Nash equilibrium given by bi = 1|N | ·(
1− 2
(α+1)·|N|
)α+1
2
kα
for all i ∈ N .
For n = 1, we refer to the appendix. For the proof of the theorem for
n ≥ 2, we need the following lemmas that are proven in the appendix.
Lemma 18. Let S be the set of providers i ∈ N with bi > 0 for some invest-
ment vector b. Then, if there is some i ∈ S with bi 6= 1|S| ·
(
1− 2
(α+1)·|S|
)α+1
2
kα
,
then b is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 19. Let S be the set of providers i ∈ N with bi > 0. If S 6= N ,
then this is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 17. Assume n ≥ 2. First, note that by Lemma 19 all
providers have to invest and by Lemma 18 in a Nash equilibrium all have
to invest b˜ = 1|N | ·
(
1− 2
(α+1)·|N|
)α+1
2
kα
. Thus, b = b˜ · 1 ∈ RN is the only
possibility for a Nash equilibrium. It remains to show that b is in fact a
Nash equlibrium. In order to do so, we fix some provider i ∈ N and prove
that b˜ is in fact a best response to b = b˜ · 1. First, we observe in Lemma 32
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in the appendix that πi(bi, b−i) is continuous in bi. We proceed by showing
that (i) b˜ is the only value fulfilling the first order conditions and (ii) yields
a positive profit. For (i) note that
∂πi(bi, b−i)
∂bi
=
k
1−α
α+1
(bi + |b|−i)
2
α+1
·
(
1− 2
(α+ 1)
· bi
bi + |b|−i
)
− k.
We have shown in Lemma 18 that b˜ fulfills the first order condition for
all i ∈ N . For showing uniqueness, define h(x) =
(
1− 2(α+1) · xx+|b|−i
)
and
observe that if h(xˆ) < 0 for some xˆ, then h(x) < 0 for all x ≥ xˆ. We conclude
that all values b∗ fulfilling the first order condition have the property b∗ < xˆ.
However, for all b∗ < xˆ, the h(b∗) is decreasing in b∗. This shows that there
is in fact only one value fulfilling the first order condition.
For (ii), observe that πi(b) evaluates to b˜
(
k
(
1− 2(α+1)n
)−1
− k
)
, which
is positive since
(
1− 2(α+1)n
)−1
> 1.
We are now ready to precisely quantify the inefficiency of subgame per-
fect Nash equilibria for any instance of a network investment game with
reservation function u(x) = 1
x1/α
, where α > 1. The proof can be found in
the appendix. As in immediate consequence, we obtain that the price of
anarchy is upper bounded by a surprisingly small constant of approximately
1.22 for every graph and every α > 1.
Theorem 20. For an instance G with u(x) = 1
x1/α
, where α > 1,
PoA(G) = PoS(G) =
(
αn
n(α+ 1)− 2
)α−1
2 2αn
n(α+ 1) + 2(α− 1) ≤ 2
√
1
e
.
As an interesting consequence, we would like to point out that the equi-
librium for a two providers game is in fact optimal.
Corollary 21. For u(x) = 1
x1/α
, where α > 1, and n = 2, we have PoA = 1.
We now consider the total providers’ profit and derive tight bounds on
the PPoA. Interestingly, in contrast to the PoA, the PPoA is not constant
but grows almost linearly with the number of providers.
Theorem 22. For an instance G with u(x) = 1
x1/α
, where α > 0, and n ≥ 2,
PPoA(G) = PPoS(G) =


∞ if α < 1,
n
(
(α+1)n−2
n(α−1)
) 1−α
2
otherwise.
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6 Conclusion
We have considered a class of games, called network investment games, in
which providers invest in bandwidth of particular services that are then used
by users to process a specific task. We studied the existence and inefficiency
of subgame perfect Nash equilibria when the underlying technology graph is
series-parallel, reflecting that services can be either complements or substi-
tutes. We showed that it is essentially without loss of generality to restrict
attention to one-edge networks. For two particular classes of reservation
functions we studied the performance of subgame perfect Nash equilibria
and we quantified this performance in terms of the social welfare and the
total providers’ profit.
Several questions remain open. We have given examples for which sub-
game perfect Nash equilibria exist and do not exit, and we have shown that
for series-parallel graphs the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria
is essentially independent of the technology graph. It would be interesting
to know if there is a (general) property of the reservation functions that
characterize the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In case there
is such an existence condition, it would be nice to find a price of anarchy
bound that is independent of the class of reservation functions being used?
Unfortunately, our results have far less implications for graphs that are not
series-parallel, like for example the Braess’ graph. Is it still true that for
more general networks providers only invest in shortest paths in equilibrium?
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A Omitted Proofs and Lemmas
Preliminaries
Proposition 23 ([25]). cb(|f |) is strictly increasing in |f |.
Proof. Given an investment matrix b, let f, f ′ be corresponding Wardrop
flows with |f | < |f ′|. We will prove that there exists a P ∈ P such that
fe < f
′
e for all e ∈ P . Suppose not, then we construct a set of vertices S
with s ∈ S and t /∈ S as follows. First, add s to S. As long as there is an
edge e from S to u ∈ V \ S with fe < f ′e add u to S. Since there is at least
one edge e ∈ P with fe ≥ f ′e for all P ∈ P, we have that t will never be
added to S. Thus, S is a proper subset of V and for all edges e from S to
V \S, fe ≥ f ′e. Given that G is series-parallel, there are no edges from V \S
to S, which would imply that |f | ≥ |f ′| which is a contradiction.
Since there exists a P ∈ P such that fe < f ′e for all e ∈ P and cost
functions are strictly increasing by definition, the proposition follows by
Remark 1.
Proposition 24. Given a vector of investment levels b, cb(|f |) is a linear
function of |f |.
Before we can prove the proposition by means of induction, we need the
following structural lemma about series-parallel graphs.
Lemma 25. Let Gst be a series-parallel graph and P be the set of simple s-t
paths in Gst. Let G
′
st arise from Gst by choosing any non-empty set P ′ ⊆
P and defining G′ = (V (G), {e ∈ E(G) | e is in at least one path in P ′}).
Then G′st is a series-parallel graph.
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Proof. We show the lemma by induction on the series-parallel graph struc-
ture. First, note that the lemma is clearly fulfilled for a series-parallel graph
with a single edge. Next, assume that Gst arises from a series composi-
tion of series-parallel graphs (Gsv and (Gvt). In this case, each path in
Gst also forms a path in Gsv and Gvt, so G
′
sv and (G
′
vt are series-parallel,
where G′sv = (V (Gsv), {e ∈ E(Gsv) | e is in at least one path in P ′}) and
G′vt = (V (Gvt), {e ∈ E(Gvt) | e is in at least one path in P ′}). Due to the
definition of G′sv and G
′
vt, the graph G
′
st can be constructed by a series
composition of G′sv and G
′
vt, thus is also series-parallel.
Now, assume that Gst arises from a parallel composition of series-parallel
graphs (G1st and G
2
st. In this case, each path in Gst forms an s-t path in
either G1st or G
2
st, so G
1′
st and G
2′
st are series-parallel, where G
1′ and G2
′
are defined as above. Due to the definition of G1
′
and G2
′
, the graph (G′st
can be constructed by a parallel composition of G1
′
st and G
2′
st, thus is also
series-parallel.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let Gst be a series-parallel graph and b some invest-
ment vector. First, we do the following preprocessing. Observe that the flow
particles can only use edges e ∈ E that are on at least one s-t path P with
be > 0 for all e ∈ P . Thus, we can ignore and delete all other edges without
changing cb(|f |). By using Lemma 25, we observe that the remaining graph
is series-parallel. In the following, we show the Proposition by induction on
the series-parallel structure.
First, note that if E(G) = {(s, t)}, i.e., E(G) contains only the edge
e = (s, t), then the cost function cb is given by definition of the cost function
of edge e, since |f | = fe. We have
cb(|f |) = ce(|f |, be) = |f |
be
,
which is a linear function in |f |. Now suppose Gst arises from a series or a
parallel composition of series-parallel graphs G1sv and G
2
vt, or G
1
st and G
2
st,
respectively. We assume that the Proposition holds for the two subgraphs
and we have cb(|f |) = g1 · |f | for G1 and cb(|f |) = g2 · |f | for G2, where
g1 and g2 are the corresponding slopes that do not depend on f . In the
following, we calculate the cost function cb(|f |) in G. First, consider the
case of a series composition. Then, the total cost of any flow particle is
clearly cb(|f |) = g1 · |f |+ g2 · |f |, which is a linear function in |f | with slope
g1 + g2. Second, for a parallel composition, note that a particle either uses
graph (G1st or (G
2
st. Both routes have the same cost, due to the definition
of the Wardrop flow. Assume w.l.o.g. that the particle travels through (G1st.
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Let |f1| denote the amount of particles using G1 and |f2| the amount of
particles using G2, respectively. Then, cb(|f |) = g1 · |f1|, where |f1| arises
such that g1|f1| = g2|f2| with |f1|+ |f2| = |f |. We conclude |f1| = g2g1+g2 |f |,
i.e.,
cb(|f |) = g1g2
g1 + g2
· |f |,
which is a linear function in f and finishes the proof.
Characterization of Equilibria
Proposition 26. Let b and b′ be investment matrices such that for all i ∈ N ,
bi and b
′
i are path strategies, and bi and b
′
i can be decomposed into path
decompositions (bi,P )P∈P∗ and (b
′
i,P )P∈P∗ only using shortest paths, respec-
tively. Additionally, let
∑
P∈P∗ bi,P =
∑
P∈P∗ b
′
i,P for all i ∈ N . Then,
πi(b
′) = πi(b) for all i ∈ N and |f(b)| = |f(b′)|.
Proof. We calculate the profit of some provider i ∈ N and show that it only
depends on the sum of the invested bandwidths. Using the Wardflow f as
defined in Lemma 27, we obtain
πi(b) =
∑
e∈E+
bi,e · f
2
e
b2e
−
∑
e∈E+
bi,e =
∑
e∈E+
bi,e ·
(( |f |
|b|
)2
− 1
)
.
Note that πi(b) only depends on |f |,
∑
e∈E+ bi,e and |b|. We can thus con-
clude that the actual choice of shortest paths is irrelevant as long as the
total investment level of a provider remains the same.
We show in the following Lemma 27, that the cost of each path only
depends on k, |f(b)| and |b|. Given that |b| = |b′|, we can conclude that
|f(b)| = |f(b′)|.
Lemma 27. Given that all providers choose path strategies on shortest
paths, the flow (fP )P∈P with
fP =
bP
|b| · |f(b)|
is a Wardrop flow. The corresponding price of edge e for a user equals
ce(fe, be) =
|f |
|b| for all e ∈ E+.
Proof. Let k be the length of all shortest paths. Since G is series-parallel,
the graph (V,E+) is a graph with the property that all s-t paths in this
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graph have length k. For all other P ∈ P, the cost of the path equals ∞ by
definition, since there must be an edge e ∈ P that is not part of any shortest
path, and thus without bandwidth. It remains to consider the paths P ∈ P∗.
First, let P ∈ P∗ with e ∈ E+ for all e ∈ P . We observe
ce(fe, be) =
fe
be
=
∑
P˜ :e∈P˜ fP˜∑
P˜ :e∈P˜ bP˜
=
∑
P˜ :e∈P˜
bP˜
|b| · |f |∑
P˜ :e∈P˜ bP˜
=
|f |
|b| ,
which proves the second part of the theorem. We conclude that
∑
P∈P
ce(fe, be) =
∑
P∈P
|f |
|b| = k
|f |
|b| .
Thus the cost of any path P with e ∈ E+ for all e ∈ P only depends on k,
|f | and |b|. Note that all paths P with some e ∈ (E\E+)∩P have cost equal
to ∞ by definition. We conclude that there is no path in G with smaller
cost than the used paths in the flow constructed above. Assuming that all
providers choose path strategies on shortest paths, the constructed flow f is
a Wardrop equilibrium.
Lemma 28. Let (G, s, t) be a series-parallel graph that is a parallel com-
position of series-parallel graphs (G1, s, t) and (G2, s, t). Let b be a vector
of path strategies of paths that all are either shortest s-t paths in G1 with
length k or shortest s-t paths in G2 with length ℓ. If k < ℓ, and bi,P2 > 0 for
some provider i ∈ N and P2 ∈ P∗(G2), then there is a demand preserving
better response for i with bi,P2 = 0.
Proof. Define |b|G1 =
∑
P∈P(G1)
bP and |b|G2 =
∑
P∈P(G2)
bP . We will prove
that the flow f defined by
fP =
bP
k
|b|G1
k
+
|b|G2
ℓ
· |f |
for all P ∈ P(G1), and
fP =
bP
ℓ
|b|G1
k
+
|b|G2
ℓ
· |f |
for all P ∈ P(G2), is a Wardrop flow.
We will show the proof only for paths P ∈ P(G1). For all P ∈ P(G2),
the proof is analogous. Notice that for all P ∈ P(G1)\P∗(G1), the costs are
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infinity as there is at least one edge without investment. For all P ∈ P∗(G1),
we have
∑
e∈P
fe
be
=
∑
e∈P
∑
P˜ :e∈P˜ fP˜∑
P˜ :e∈P˜ bP˜
=
∑
e∈P
∑
P˜ :e∈P˜
b
P˜
k
|b|G1
k
+
|b|G2
ℓ
· |f |∑
P˜ :e∈P˜ bP˜
=
∑
e∈P
|f |
k
|b|G1
k
+
|b|G2
ℓ
=
|f |
|b|G1
k
+
|b|G2
ℓ
.
Thus the cost of all used paths are the same, and hence the constructed flow
is a Wardrop flow.
Now, suppose that there is a provider i ∈ N with bi,P2 > 0 for some
P2 ∈ P(G2). We show that provider i has a demand preserving better
response. First, note that the total profit of provider i equals
πi(b) =
∑
e∈E+
bi,e · f
2
e
b2e
−
∑
e∈E+
bi,e
=
∑
P∈P:bi,P>0
∑
e∈P
bi,P · f
2
e
b2e
−
∑
e∈E+
bi,e
=
∑
P∈P:bi,P>0
bi,P
∑
e∈P

 |f ||P |
|b|G1
k
+
|b|G2
ℓ


2
−
∑
e∈E+
bi,e
=
∑
P∈P:bi,P>0
bi,P
1
|P |
(
|f |
|b|G1
k
+
|b|G2
ℓ
)2
−
∑
e∈E+
bi,e
=
(
|f |
|b|G1
k
+
|b|G2
ℓ
)2 ∑
P∈P:bi,P>0
bi,P
|P | −
∑
e∈E+
bi,e
Next, we show that i has a demand preserving better response by shifting
some investment from P2 to a path P1 ∈ P∗(G1). Let b′i,P1 = bi,P1 + kℓ · bi,P2
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on path P1 and b
′
i,P2
= 0 on P2. We observe that |f(b)| = |f(b′)|, since
cb(|f |) = |f ||b|G1
k
+
|b|G2
l
=
|f |
|b|G1+
k
ℓ
bi,P2
k
+
|b|G2−bi,P2
l
= cb′(|f |) .
The total difference in the profit of provider i is
πi(b
′
i, b−i)− πi(bi, b−i)
=
(
|f |
|b|G1
k
+
|b|G2
ℓ
)2(
k
ℓ
bi,P2
k
− bi,P2
ℓ
)
−
(
k
k
ℓ
bi,P2 − ℓbi,P2
)
= bi,P2
(
ℓ− k
2
ℓ
)
.
Since k < ℓ, this term is positive and the deviation is profitable.
Lemma 29. Let (G, s, t) be a series-parallel graph that is a series compo-
sition of series-parallel graphs (G1, s, v) and (G2, v, t). Let b be a vector of
investments (bi,e)i∈N,e∈E that can be partitioned into (b
1
i,e)i∈N,e∈E(G1) and
(b2i,e)i∈N,e∈E(G2) such that b
1 and b2 are shortest path strategies in their cor-
responding graphs G1 and G2, respectively.
(i) If
∑
P∈P∗(G1)
b1i,P 6=
∑
P∈P∗(G2)
b2i,P for some provider i ∈ N , then
there is a demand preserving better response for some j ∈ N .
(ii) If, additionally,
∑
P∈P∗(G1)
b1m,P =
∑
P∈P∗(G2)
b2m,P for all providers
m 6= i, then the following holds. For every strategy bi there is a shortest
path strategy b′i with |f(b−i, bi)| = |f(b−i, b′i)| and at least the same
profit for provider i, i.e., πi(b−i, bi) ≤ πi(b−i, b′i).
Proof. We start the proof by showing (i). Define |bi|G1 =
∑
P∈P∗(G1)
b1i,P
and |bi|G2 =
∑
P∈P∗(G2)
b2i,P for all i ∈ N , and |b|G1 =
∑
i∈N |bi|G1 and
|b|G2 =
∑
i∈N |bi|G2 . Observe that in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if
|f | = 0, then either |b|G1 = 0 or |b|G2 = 0. In that case, provider i ∈ N with
|bi|G1 6= |bi|G2 has a demand preserving better response by not investing at
all. So we can assume that |f | > 0. W.l.o.g. suppose that |b|G1 ≤ |b|G2 . We
show that there exists a provider j ∈ N that has a profitable deviation.
Since there is a provider i ∈ N with |bi|G1 6= |bi|G2 , there is a provider
j ∈ N with |bj |G1 < |bj |G2 and |bj |G1|b|G1 ≤
|bj |G2
|b|G2
. This provider exists, because∑
i∈N
|bi|G1
|b|G1
=
∑
i∈N
|bi|G2
|b|G2
= 1, and for all providers m ∈ N with |bm|G1 ≥
|bm|G2 , we have |bm|G1|b|G1 ≥
|bm|G2
|b|G2
.
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Let k denote the length of a shortest s-t path in G1, and ℓ the length
of a shortest s-t path in G2. In the following we will observe that πj(b)
only depends on |bj |G1 and |bj |G2 and not on the particular investments on
shortest paths.
πi(b)
=
∑
e∈E+
bi,e · f
2
e
b2e
−
∑
e∈E+
bi,e
=
∑
e∈E+(G1)
bi,e · f
2
e
b2e
+
∑
e∈E+(G2)
bi,e · f
2
e
b2e
−
∑
e∈E+
bi,e
=
∑
P∈P(G1):b1i,P>0
∑
e∈P
b1i,P ·
f2e
b2e
+
∑
P∈P(G2):b2i,P>0
∑
e∈P
b2i,P ·
f2e
b2e
−
∑
e∈E+
bi,e
=
∑
P∈P(G1):b1i,P>0
b1i,P ·
∑
e∈P
( |f |
|b|G1
)2
+
∑
P∈P(G2):b2i,P>0
b2i,P ·
∑
e∈P
( |f |
|b|G2
)2
−
∑
e∈E+
bi,e
= k ·
( |f |
|b|G1
)2
· |bi|G1 + ℓ ·
( |f |
|b|G2
)2
· |bi|G2 − (k · |bi|G1 + ℓ · |bi|G2) ,
where the fourth equality follows because the Wardrop flow in G can be
decomposed into a Wardrop flow in G1 and G2 as all providers are investing
in shortest paths.
Assume that provider j chooses a vector of investments b′j with |b′j |G1 =
|bj |G1 + ǫ and |b′j|G2 = |bj |G2 −
|b|2G2
·ǫ·k
|b|2G1
·ℓ+|b|G1 ·ǫ·ℓ+|b|G2 ·ǫ·k
, where ǫ > 0 is suffi-
ciently small. We observe that |f(b)| = |f(b′)|, since
cb(|f |) =
∑
e∈P∩E(G1)
|f |
|b|G1
+
∑
e∈P∩E(G2)
|f |
|b|G2
= k · |f ||b|G1
+ ℓ · |f ||b|G2
= k · |f ||b|G1 + ǫ
+ ℓ · |f |
|b|G2 −
|b|2G2
·ǫ·k
|b|2G1
·ℓ+|b|G1 ·ǫ·ℓ+|b|G2 ·ǫ·k
= cb′(|f |),
where the third equality follows from basic calculus.
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The total difference in the profit of provider j is
πj(b
′
j , b−j)− πj(bj , b−j)
=k ·
(( |f |
|b|G1 + ǫ
)2
· (|bj |G1 + ǫ)−
( |f |
|b|G1
)2
· |bj|G1
)
+ℓ ·



 |f |
|b|G2 −
|b|2G2
·ǫ·k
|b|2G1
·ℓ+|b|G1 ·ǫ·ℓ+|b|G2 ·ǫ·k


2
·
(
|bj |G2 −
|b|2G2 · ǫ · k
|b|2G1 · ℓ+ |b|G1 · ǫ · ℓ+ |b|G2 · ǫ · k
)
−
( |f |
|b|G2
)2
· |bj |G2
)
−
(
k · ǫ− ℓ · |b|
2
G2
· ǫ · k
|b|2G1 · ℓ+ |b|G1 · ǫ · ℓ+ |b|G2 · ǫ · k
)
and thus
∂
(
πj(b
′
j , b−j)− πj(bj , b−j)
)
∂ǫ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ǫ=0
=
k
|b|2G1
·
(
2 · |f |2 ·
( |bj |G2
|b|G2
− |bj |G1|b|G1
)
+
(|b|2G2 − |b|2G1)
)
> 0,
where the inequality follows because either |b|G1 = |b|G2 and then |bj |G1|b|G1 <
|bj |G2
|b|G2
, or |b|G1 < |b|G2 and |bj |G1|b|G1 ≤
|bj |G2
|b|G2
, which completes the proof of (i).
In order to show (ii) we revisit the proof of (i) and use the additional
property that |b|G1 − |bi|G1 = |b|G2 − |bi|G2 =: α. From (i) we conclude
πi(b) = k ·
( |f |
|b|G1
)2
· |bi|G1 + ℓ ·
( |f |
|b|G2
)2
· |bi|G2 − (k · |bi|G1 + ℓ · |bi|G2)
= |f |2
(
k
(α+ |bi|G1)2
|bi|G1 +
ℓ
(α+ |bi|G2)2
|bi|G2
)
− (k · |bi|G1 + ℓ · |bi|G2) .
In order to construct a path strategy on shortest paths, we choose a shortest
path strategy b′i with |b′i|G1 = |b′i|G2 = β for
β =
k|bi|G1 (α+ |bi|G2) + |bi|G2ℓ (α+ |bi|G1)
k (α+ |bi|G2) + ℓ (α+ |bi|G1)
.
We can check easily that β is exactly chosen in a way that
k
α+ |bi|G1
+
ℓ
α+ |bi|G2
=
k + ℓ
α+ β
,
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i.e., such that cb(|f |) = cb−i,b′i(|f |), thus the switch of provider i from bi to b′i
is demand preserving. It remains to show that the profit is not decreasing.
We observe
πi(b−i, b
′
i)− πi(b)
= |f |2
(
k + ℓ
(α+ β)2
β − k
(α+ |bi|G1)2
|bi|G1 −
ℓ
(α+ |bi|G2)2
|bi|G2
)
+ (k · |bi|G1 + ℓ · |bi|G2)− (k + ℓ)β
= |f |2 kℓα(|bi|G1 − |bi|G2)
2
(k + ℓ)2(α+ |bi|G1)2(α+ |bi|G2)2
+
kℓ(|bi|G1 − |bi|G2)2
|bi|G1ℓ+ |bi|G2k + α(k + ℓ)
≥ 0,
which completes the proof of (ii).
Homogeneous Users
Lemma 30. For u(x) = R for all x ∈ [0, d], and u(x) = 0 for all x > d,
where d ∈ R+,
(i) the demand |f(b)| is given by the function |f(b)| = min
{
R·|b|
k
, d
}
and
(ii) the profit πi is given by πi(bi, b−i) = min
{
k ·
(
R2
k2
− 1
)
· bi, k ·
(
d2
|b|2
− 1
)
· bi
}
,
where k denotes the length of a shortest s-t path.
Proof. Suppose that |b| ≤ d·k
R
. Then the following equivalence follows
u(δ(|b|)) = k · δ(|b|)|b| ⇔ R = k · δ(|b|)|b| ⇔ δ(|b|) = R·|b|k . This implies that
δ(|b|) = min
{
R·|b|
k
, d
}
.
Using the definition of a provider’s profit, we also get that πi(bi, b−i) =
k ·
(
δ(|b|)2
|b|2 − 1
)
· bi = min
{
k ·
(
R2
k2
− 1
)
· bi, k ·
(
d2
|b|2 − 1
)
· bi
}
.
Theorem 12. There always exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By Lemma 11,
πi(bi, b−i) =


k ·
(
R2
k2
− 1
)
· bi if |b| ≤ d·kR ,
k ·
(
d2
|b|2
− 1
)
· bi otherwise.
We distinguish the following three cases: R < k, R = k, and R > k.
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Suppose that R < k. Then R
2
k2
< 1 and thus πi(b) < 0 for all i ∈ N with
bi > 0 and all b ∈ RN+ . Hence bi = 0 for all i ∈ N is the unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
Now, suppose that R = k. Then R
2
k2
= 1 and thus πi(b) = 0 for all i ∈ N
and all b ∈ RN+ with |b| ≤ d·kR , and πi(b) < 0 for all i ∈ N with bi > 0 and
all b ∈ RN+ with |b| > d·kR . Hence all b ∈ RN+ with |b| ≤ d·kR are a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
Finally, suppose that R > k. Assume that b ∈ RN+ is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, we will derive some properties. First, since R
2
k2
> 1, there
cannot be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with |b| < d·k
R
, as the profit
function of all i ∈ N is a strictly increasing linear function in that region,
and thus we can conclude that |b| ≥ d·k
R
. Second, since πi(b) ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ N , we must have |b| ≤ d. In particular, this implies that for all i ∈ N
with bi > 0, πi(b) > 0 as by slightly decreasing the investment, the provider
would gain a strictly positive profit. But then πi(b) > 0 for all i ∈ N ,
as
(
d2
|b|2
− 1
)
> 0 and a provider without investment could gain a strictly
positive profit by investing an arbitrary small, but positive amount. This
implies that it is sufficient to check the first order conditions of all providers
i ∈ N . Given the kink in the profit function at |b| = d·k
R
, the first order
condition is given by d2 · |b|−2bi|b|3 ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N , where the inequality is an
equality if |b| > d·k
R
. We now consider two subcases: either d2 · |b|−2bi
|b|3
< 1
for some i ∈ N , or d2 · |b|−2bi
|b|3
= 1 for all i ∈ N .
First, suppose that d2 · |b|−2bi
|b|3
< 1 for some i ∈ N . Then by the first
order conditions, |b| = d·k
R
and bi ≥ d · k·(R
2−k2)
2R3
for all i ∈ N . Summing over
all i ∈ N , yields k2
R2
> n−2
n
. In particular, bi =
d·k
n·R for all i ∈ N is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium, because |b| = d·k
R
and d2· |b|−2bi
|b|3
= d2·
n−2
n
·( d·kR )
( d·kR )
3 < 1.
Second, suppose that d2 · |b|−2bi
|b|3
= 1 for all i ∈ N . Then by rewriting
the first order condition, we have bi = d ·
√
n−2
n3
for all i ∈ N . This is a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if |b| ≥ d·k
R
, or equivalently
√
n−2
n
≥ k
R
.
Notice that in this case the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is unique.
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Heterogeneous Users
Lemma 31. Let k denote the number of edges on a shortest s-t path in G.
For u(x) = 1
x1/α
, where α > 0,
(i) the demand |f(b)| is given by the function |f(b)| =
(
|b|
k
) α
α+1
and
(ii) the profit πi is given by πi(bi, b−i) = bi
(
(bi + |b|−i)
−2
α+1 k
−α+1
α+1 − k
)
.
Proof. We prove the two parts separately.
(i) u(x) = k · x|b| ⇔ 1x1/α = k · x|b| ⇔ x =
(
|b|
k
) α
α+1
.
(ii) πi(bi, b−i) = k
(
|f(bi + |b|−i)|2 bi(bi+|b|−i)2 − bi
)
= bi
(
(bi + |b|−i)
−2
α+1k
−α+1
α+1 − k
)
.
Lemma 32. Let i ∈ N . If there exists a provider j 6= i with bj > 0 or
α > 1, then πi(bi, b−i) is continuous in bi.
Proof. By Lemma 31, the profit function is a continuous function on (0,∞).
So the only possible point of discontinuity is at 0. Notice that πi(0, b−i) = 0
by definition. Remains to show that lim
bi→0
πi(bi, b−i) = 0.
Case 1: there exists a provider j 6= i with bj > 0. Then as bi → 0, the
quantity in the bracket converges to the constant k
1−α
α+1
(|b|−i)
2
α+1
−k and as bi → 0,
we have lim
bi→0
πi(bi, b−i) = 0.
Case 2: bj = 0 for all j 6= i and α > 1. Then by Lemma 31, we have
b
α−1
α+1
i k
−α+1
α+1 − k · bi. Since α > 1, lim
bi→0
b
α−1
α+1
i = 0 and hence lim
bi→0
πi(bi, b−i) =
0.
Theorem 17. Let k denote the length of a shortest s-t path in G. For
n = 1, there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if α > 1.
If α > 1, the equilibrium is unique and given by b1 =
(
1− 2
(α+1)
)α+1
2
kα
.
For n ≥ 2, there is a unique Nash equilibrium given by bi = 1|N | ·(
1− 2
(α+1)·|N|
)α+1
2
kα
for all i ∈ N .
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Proof. Assume n = 1. By Lemma 31 the payoff for one provider evaluates
to π1(b1) = b1
(
b
−2
α+1
1 k
1−α
α+1 − k
)
. We consider three different cases.
Case 1: α < 1. Then lim
b1→0
π1(b1) =∞ and thus there is no best response.
Case 2: α = 1. Then π1(b1) = 1 − k · b1 and and thus there is no best
response.
Case 3: α > 1. By Lemma 32, the profit function is continuous. Moreover,
we have lim
b1→∞
π1(b1) = −∞. This implies that any Nash equilibrium with
positive profit for provider 1 has to fulfill the first-order condition: ∂π1(b1)
∂b1
=
α−1
α+1b
−2
α+1
1 k
1−α
α+1 − k = 0, yielding b1 =
(
1− 2
(α+1)
)α+1
2
kα
. Since this is the unique
point satisfying the first order conditions, this must be a global maximum.
Lemma 33. Let S be the set of providers i ∈ N with bi > 0 for some invest-
ment vector b. Then, if there is some i ∈ S with bi 6= 1|S| ·
(
1− 2
(α+1)·|S|
)α+1
2
kα
,
then b is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If |S| = 1, see Theorem 17. Assume that |S| ≥ 2. By Lemma 32,
the profit function is continuous. Moreover, lim
bi→∞
(bi + |b|−i)
−2
α+1k
1−α
α+1 = 0
and hence lim
bi→∞
πi(bi, b−i) = −∞. This implies that any Nash equilibrium
with positive profit for provider i has to fulfill the first-order condition for
all i ∈ S:
∂πi(bi, b−i)
∂bi
= 0
⇔ k
1−α
α+1
(bi + |b|−i)
2
α+1
·
(
1− 2
(α+ 1)
· bi
bi + |b|−i
)
− k = 0
⇔ bi = k
1−α
α+1 · |b| −2α+1 − k
2
α+1 · k
1−α
α+1 · |b|−α−3α+1
.
The right-hand side is independent on i and the same for all providers i ∈
S. Hence bi = bj for all i ∈ S. Setting bi = 1|S| · |b| yields bi = 1|S| ·(
1− 2
(α+1)·|S|
)α+1
2
kα
.
Lemma 34. Let S be the set of providers i ∈ N with bi > 0. If S 6= N ,
then this is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
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Before we can prove Lemma 19, we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 35. bi = 0 for all i ∈ N is not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let i ∈ N and assume that bj = 0 for all j 6= i. Suppose that bi = 0
is a best response. We derive a contradiction.
πi(bi, b−i) = k
1−α
α+1 · b
α−1
α+1
i − k · bi > 0⇔ bi <
1
kα
.
Hence there always exists a bi > 0 so that πi(bi, b−i) > 0.
Lemma 36. bi > 0 for some i ∈ N and bj = 0 for all j 6= i is not a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. Let i ∈ N and assume that bj = 0 for all j 6= i. Suppose that bi > 0
is a best response. We derive a contradiction. Recall that πi(bi, b−i) =
k
1−α
α+1 · b
α−1
α+1
i − k · bi.
Case 1: α < 1. Then lim
bi→0
πi(bi, b−i) = ∞ and hence 0 < b′i < bi is a
better response.
Case 2: α = 1. Then πi(bi, b−i) = 1 − k · bi and hence 0 < b′i < bi is a
better response.
Case 3: α > 1. By Theorem 17, bi =
(
1− 2
(α+1)
)α+1
2
kα
. Since the profit
function of provider j 6= i is continuous by Lemma 32, it is sufficient to show
that
∂πj(bj ,b−j)
∂bj
> 0 at bj = 0. Hence
k
1−α
α+1
b
2
α+1
i
−k = k·
(
1− 2(α+1)
)−1
−k > 0.
Proof of Lemma 19. If |S| = 0, see Lemma 35. If |S| = 1, see Lemma 36.
Suppose that |S| ≥ 2. By Lemma 18, |b| =
(
1− 2
(α+1)·|S|
)α+1
2
kα
. Since the profit
function of provider i ∈ N \ S is continuous by Lemma 32, it is sufficient
to show that ∂πi(bi,b−i)
∂bi
> 0 at bi = 0. Evaluating
∂πi(bi,b−i)
∂bi
at bi = 0 yields
k
1−α
α+1
|b|
2
α+1
−k. Plugging in |b| yields k ·
(
1− 2(α+1)·|S|
)−1
−k = l, which is clearly
positive since
(
1− 2(α+1)·|S|
)−1
> 1.
Theorem 20. For an instance G with u(x) = 1
x1/α
, where α > 1,
PoA(G) = PoS(G) =
(
αn
n(α+ 1)− 2
)α−1
2 2αn
n(α+ 1) + 2(α− 1) ≤ 2
√
1
e
.
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Proof. We begin the proof by deriving a closed form expression for the social
welfare.
SW (b) =
∫ |f(b)|
0
u(x) dx−k|b| =
∫ ( |b|
k
) α
α+1
0
x−
1
α dx−k|b| = α
α− 1
( |b|
k
) α
α+1
−k|b|,
where we used |f(b)| =
(
|b|
k
) α
α+1
which is proven in Lemma 31 in the ap-
pendix.
In the following, we can compute the social optimum. Note that the so-
cial welfare function is continuous in |b| and limb→∞ SW (b) = −∞. Hence
the first order conditions, if unique, are sufficient to ensure a global maxi-
mum, α
α+1 |b|
−2
α+1 k
1−α
α+1 − k = 0 ⇔ |b| =
(
α
α+1
)α+1
2
k−α. Thus, the optimal
social welfare is
α
α−1
(
( αα+1)
α+1
2 k−α
k
)α−1
α+1
−k
(
α
α+1
)α+1
2
k−α =
(
α
α+1
)α−1
2
k1−α 2α(α−1)(α+1) .
By Theorem 17, the equilibrium social welfare is
α
α−1


(
1− 2
(α+1)·|N|
)α+1
2
kα
k


α−1
α+1
−k
(
1− 2
(α+1)·|N|
)α+1
2
kα
=
(
1− 2(α+1)n
)α−1
2
k1−α
(
1
α−1 +
2
(α+1)n
)
.
Thus, PoA(G) = (
α
α+1)
α−1
2 k1−α 2α
(α−1)(α+1)(
1− 2
(α+1)n
)α−1
2
k1−α
(
1
α−1
+ 2
(α+1)n
) =
(
αn
n(α+1)−2
)α−1
2 2αn
n(α+1)+2(α−1) .
To prove the last inequality, observe that if n = 1, PoA(G) = 2α(
α
α−1)
α−1
2
3α−1 <
2
√
1
e
.
For n ≥ 2, we have ∂PoA(G)
∂n
=
2(α2−1)(n−1)
(
αn
n(α+1)−2
)α+1
2
n(n(α+1)+2(α−1))2
≥ 0.
As n→∞, PoA(G)→ 2
(
α
α+1
)α−1
2 α
α+1 = 2
√(
1− 1
α+1
)α+1
≤ 2
√
1
e
.
Theorem 22. For an instance G with u(x) = 1
x1/α
, where α > 0, and n ≥ 2,
PPoA(G) = PPoS(G) =


∞ if α < 1,
n
(
(α+1)n−2
n(α−1)
) 1−α
2
otherwise.
For the proof of the theorem, the following simple lemma on the providers’
profit in equilibrium is crucial.
34
Lemma 37. If b ∈ E(G), then∑i∈N πi(b) = (1− 2(α+1)·|N |)
α−1
2
k1−α 2(α+1)n .
Proof. By Theorem 17, |b| =
(
1− 2
(α+1)·|N|
)α+1
2
kα
. By Lemma 31,
∑
i∈N πi(b) =
|b|α−1α+1k 1−αα+1 − |b| · k =
(
1− 2(α+1)·|N |
)α−1
2
k1−α 2(α+1)n .
Proof of Theorem 22. We consider three different cases. Case 1: α < 1.
Since sup
b
∑
i∈N πi(b) → ∞ as |b| → 0 and min
b∈E(G)
∑
i∈N πi(b) < ∞, we con-
clude the result.
Case 2: α = 1. Since sup
b
∑
i∈N πi(b) < 1 for all |b| ≥ 0, we have by Lemma
37 that PPoA(G) = n.
Case 3: α > 1. By Lemma 37, PPoA(G) =
(
1− 2
(α+1)
)α−1
2
k1−α 2
(α+1)(
1− 2
(α+1)·|N|
)α−1
2
k1−α 2
(α+1)n
=
n
(
(α+1)n−2
n(α−1)
) 1−α
2
.
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